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Back Down to Earth: Reassembling Latour’s Anthropocenic 
Geopolitics 
Philip Conway 
The principal intuition of this essay is that Bruno Latour’s explicitly or implicitly 
‘geopolitical’ works – strewn as they are across many years and innumerable 
texts – have not yet been coherently assembled in such a way that their critical 
interrogation relative to contemporary debates in political geography can 
gainfully proceed. Such a reassembly must consider ‘earlier,’ ‘later’ and 
whatever other Latours. Although ‘politics’ per se has, in his more recent works, 
become just one ‘mode of existence’ among others, every aspect of Latour’s 
thought has political ramifications. Consequently, his works must be read 
‘anthropologically’ – that is to say, in cognisance of the interimplicatedness of 
every typological strand of ‘the social’ taken altogether. In short, this essay 
attempts not only to read Latour’s works more interconnectedly than have other 
readers, it reads Latour’s ‘geopolitical’ writings in a more joined-up fashion than 
he has himself written them. To this end, it: (a) introduces the major elements of 
Latour’s political philosophy, highlighting the importance of geopolitical issues 
and concepts from his early works onwards; (b) précises his fifteen ‘modes of 
existence,’ laying out the philosophical resources that will be subsequently 
rewoven; (c) examines six key allies with whom he rearticulates first geo (James 
Lovelock, Peter Sloterdijk) and politics (Walter Lippmann, John Dewey) 
separately and then geopolitics (Michel Serres, Carl Schmitt) itself; and, finally, 
(d) details his Anthropocenic geopolitics conceptually by speculatively 
intertwining the above with his recent Gifford Lectures. The reassembly 
attempted – or, rather, initiated – herein is, therefore, neither disinterested nor 
definitive. It is a working through of the possibilities internal to a specific, albeit 
sprawling, bundle of texts. It presents a reading both constructive and ‘charitable’ 
– not in order to obviate critical interrogations but in the hope of provoking a 
more incisive debate concerning Latour’s works in relation to political 
geography. 
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[…] geo-politics is not about human politics overlaid on the Earth’s static frame, 
but politics concerning contradictory portions, visions, aspects of the Earth and its 
contending humans. (Latour 2014f, 52) 
Introduction 
The history of the word ‘geopolitics’ bears more than its share of ignominy. Coined by 
Swedish political scientist and politician Rudolf Kjellén (as ‘Geopolitik’) in 1899 and 
soon applied to the imperialist, state-serving geographies of the time, by the mid-1920s 
‘geopolitics’ had become a commonplace of political elites from Germany to Japan 
(Dodds and Atkinson 2000). It fell from favour after World War II, having become 
associated with Nazi expansionism, but was revived during the Cold War as the likes of 
Henry Kissinger sought to articulate superpower Grand Strategy (Dalby, Routledge, and 
Tuathail 1998). While always contested (Kearns 2009), from the early 1990s the 
discourse came under increasing fire from advocates of ‘critical geopolitics’ who took 
issue with the essentialist, fatalistic naturalisation of violence and enmity that 
geopolitical thinking habitually engendered (e.g. Dalby 1991; Dalby and Tuathail 1998; 
Tuathail 1996). ‘Geopolitics,’ however prefixed, is today affixed to a dizzyingly wide 
array of scholarly endeavours; however, it tends to retain a thematic connection to 
territorial competition, state violence and the international. 
It is in this context that Simon Dalby, Stuart Elden, Nigel Clark, Kathryn Yusoff 
and others have recently debated concepts such as ‘geologic’ and ‘Anthropocene’ 
geopolitics (Dalby 2007, 2013a, b, 2014a, b; Elden 2013b, 2015; Clark 2011, 2013a, b, 
2014; Yusoff 2013a, b; Yusoff et al. 2012). In the face of present ecological and 
political crises, these authors argue that the geo- in geopolitics must have its 
etymological connection with gē (earth) radically reaffirmed. Can we return, asks Elden 
(2013b, 15), ‘to thinking about land, earth, world rather than simply the global or 
international?’ What would happen if geo- implied not some reified spatial realm but, 
rather, ‘the earth; the air and the subsoil; questions of land, terrain, territory; earth 
processes and understandings of the world’? These questions are by no means 
unprecedented within political geography; however, nor are they satisfactorily 
answerable given present resources. Elden therefore sketches a research agenda from 
which this essay takes its lead, specifically by examining the recent political works of 
Bruno Latour. 
3 
The story of Latour’s political thought, like so many French intellectuals 
(Ahuluwalia 2010), begins with his experience of colonialism. From 1973 to 1975, 
while writing his thesis on Charles Péguy’s Clio and the biblical exegete Rudolf 
Bultmann, he avoided military service by electing to teach at a lycée in Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire. It was also at this time that he was introduced to ‘the puzzles of anthropology’ 
for the first time. For ‘a provincial, bourgeois Catholic,’ this immersion in ‘the cauldron 
of neocolonial Africa,’ with its racism, violence and ‘the most predatory forms of 
capitalism,’ was revelatory (Latour 2013a, 289-90; Schmidgen 2014). Combined with 
his prior intuitions regarding the specific truth conditions of religious speech, it 
prompted a career-defining realisation. The Ivorians, to the colonial eye, were a mêlée 
of all manner of explanation-begging cultural peculiarities. The Westerners, however, 
understood their own conduct by the singular standards of Science and Rationality. The 
pedagogues of the mission civilisatrice explained but needed no explanation. There 
could be no anthropology of the Moderns as they were the one culture with access to 
Nature – or so they thought. This ‘flagrant asymmetry’ formed the problematique that 
would lead Latour to declare that ‘we have never been modern’ and then, four decades 
after Abidjan, to publish An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the 
Moderns (AIME) (2013c). 
 Latour’s entire career can, therefore, be read as ‘geopolitical’ in a philosophico-
anthropological sense; however, it wasn’t until his recent Gifford Lectures that Latour 
took up the term explicitly, if idiosyncratically, by articulating and advocating a ‘new 
geopolitics of the Anthropocene’ (2013b, 2); that is, geopolitics understood as the 
politics of the Earth itself – as, in a manner of speaking, ‘Gaia-politics.’ Similarly, 
James Lovelock’s famous Earth goddess1 had been a recurrent motif in Latour’s work 
since the turn of the century (e.g. [1999]2004a, 5; 2007a, 2010a, 2011d); however, it 
wasn’t until these lectures, titled Facing Gaia, that Latour undertook a thorough reading 
of Lovelock’s work for the first time. In so doing, he produced not just an alternative, 
Earthbound ‘geopolitics’ but a geopolitical theology of Nature (cf. Schmitt 2005) that 
encompassed not only politics per se but also science, law and, crucially, religion. 
The principal intuition of this essay is that, while Latour is well-known within 
political geography, his explicitly or implicitly ‘geopolitical’ works have not yet been 
                                                 
1 Gaia: one of the primordial Greek deities, personifying earth [gē]. 
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coherently assembled in such a way that their critical interrogation relative to 
contemporary debates can gainfully proceed. While there is an unciteably vast 
transdisciplinary literature on Latour’s work, little of it examines his recent political 
writings and that which does (e.g. Harman 2014) treats his political thought as a single, 
isolatable strand within his broader corpus. Although ‘politics’ as such has, lately, 
become just one ‘mode of existence’ among others, every aspect of Latour’s thought has 
political ramifications. Consequently, his works must be read ‘anthropologically’– that 
is to say, in cognisance of the interimplicatedness of every typological strand of ‘the 
social’ taken altogether.2 
However, this is not a merely pedagogical exercise. While ‘Gaia’ was posed as 
the pivotal figure in both AIME (2013c) and the Gifford Lectures (2013b), the precise 
relationship between these parallel texts is not altogether clear. Therefore, this essay 
attempts not only to read Latour’s works more interconnectedly than have other readers, 
it reads Latour’s ‘geopolitical’ writings in a more joined-up fashion than he has himself 
written them. To this end it proceeds thus: 
(1) Introduces the major elements of Latour’s political philosophy, highlighting the 
importance of geopolitical concepts from his early works onwards. 
(2) Précises AIME and its fifteen ‘modes of existence,’ laying out the philosophical 
resources to be subsequently rewoven. 
(3) Examines six key allies with whom Latour rearticulates first geo (James 
Lovelock, Peter Sloterdijk) and politics (Walter Lippmann, John Dewey) 
separately and then geopolitics (Michel Serres, Carl Schmitt) itself. 
(4) Conceptually reconstructs Latour’s Anthropocenic geopolitics, speculatively 
intertwining the above with Facing Gaia. 
I conclude by examining the possibilities and problems that Latour’s work poses to 
scholars of geopolitics, particularly with regard to aforementioned debates. 
                                                 
2 Although previously rejecting ‘the social’ as a concept (Latour 2005b), in AIME this term 
comes to designate the modes of existence taken altogether (Latour 2013c, 353; cf. Tarde 
[1893]2012); in other words, it is that towards which a philosophical anthropology strives 




In an unassuming and, until recently (Harman 2009), largely overlooked appendix to 
The Pasteurization of France ([1984]1988a),3 Latour set out his philosophical vision for 
the first time. A polemical, irreverent and, by his own estimation, ‘juvenile’ text (2010b, 
3), Irreductions presumed to abolish the binary opposition of force and reason by 
constructing a common ‘infralanguage’ for both science and politics based upon the 
now famous ontology of translation, trials, alliances and actants. Christening this his 
‘Tractatus Scientifico-Politicus’ (7), alluding to Spinoza’s own heretical treatise (Nadler 
2011), Latour mixed Tolstoy’s War and Peace, Leibnizian monadology and Greimasian 
semiotics with a large dose of Nietzschean will to power in order to produce a kind of 
metaphysical Machiavellianism, a politics ‘extended to the politics of things-in-
themselves’ (211). In this philosophy: a thing is what it does; it is only as strong as its 
alliances; it grows stronger by temporarily enrolling and subordinating others; entities 
may aspire to universality but are limited to particularity; no substance undergirds 
action; restless, dynamic, vigilant activity is therefore a perpetual necessity; every thing 
is the result of vectors, trials and battles of force. 
Written at the height of the ‘second’ Cold War and shot through with allusions 
to the nuclear terror, Irreductions is consonant with Latour’s attitude throughout the 
early part of his career that ‘technoscience is part of a war machine and should be 
studied as such’ (Latour 1987b, 172; cf. Latour 1988b; Latour and Woolgar [1979]1986, 
212; Latour and Callon 1981). Philosophically, it forms not the foundation but the 
toolbox for his later work. He would gradually desist from making Machiavellian 
alliance-building the default mode of association for all existents – i.e. making every 
thing ‘political’; however, non-human things would remain centre-stage, even as his 
politics became more precisely defined. 
Moderns 
In a book that remains the outstanding landmark in his career, Latour introduced his 
signature thesis and refrain: We Have Never Been Modern (WHNBM) ([1991]1993). We 
Westerners, we Moderns are, claims Latour, beholden to an unwritten, unspoken 
                                                 
3 Published in French as ‘Pasteur: guerre et paix des microbes [war and peace of microbes].’ 
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‘Constitution,’ a kind of semi-official political-metaphysical common sense founded on 
the strict opposition of Politics and Science – a divide to which corresponds two kinds 
of ‘sovereign’: the State and Nature (cf. Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Hobbes 
[1651]1968). For many years this theoretical opposition held, its associated practices 
thrived and so ‘we thought we were Modern’ – but it all worked too well. The year 1989 
was, for Latour, doubly world-historical: the Wall fell but, at least as importantly, the 
climate irrupted into popular consciousness and was permanently engraved in the 
international political agenda (8-10). Henceforth, argues Latour, our non-Modern 
predicament is the ever increasing entanglement of humans and non-humans – a 
situation both enabled and ignored by the Modern Constitution. In such a condition, the 
distinct onto-administrative columns of Science-Nature/Politics-State break down. 
Therefore, reasons Latour, we must invent another Constitution, one that recognises 
that history is not a process of supersession and overcoming but rather of ever greater 
attachment and co-dependence; one that understands that the West differs from its 
Others only in the intensity of its socio-technical hybridisation, not in kind – ‘we are as 
different from the Achuar as they are from the Tapirape or the Arapesh’ (107); a 
Constitution, in short, that finds humans, non-humans and hybrids a political-
metaphysical Settlement in the absence of any stable or reliable concept of Nature and 
without the now absurd teleological pretensions of the colonial ‘frontier of 
modernisation.’ 
Latour is, by this point, no longer arguing that science and politics are one and 
the same but rather that to define one is to define the other (4); he thus opens the door to 
their formal distinction. Things, meanwhile, remain at the centre of politics but for 
slightly different reasons than before: it is not that every thing is political per se but 
rather that politics has become unthinkable without the immense irruption of hybrid 
things into collective affairs. 
Collectives 
WHNBM concludes with an enigmatic call for a ‘Parliament of Things’ (142-45); 
Politics of Nature (PoN) ([1999]2004a) develops this notion, envisaging an abstract 
political body in which a Collective of humans and non-humans could settle their issues 
via a ‘due process’ that grants science and politics distinct roles with neither overriding 
the other. The mechanics of this hypothetical, scale-nonspecific polity are complex and 
not directly relevant here; however, several aspects are of paramount importance. 
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Firstly, because the Collective makes no a priori distinction as to what beings it 
includes (unlike Society, which is restricted to naked humans and their language), it 
requires an alternative means of distinguishing inside from outside, polity from 
environment. Latour finds this principle in Carl Schmitt’s (2007) friend/enemy 
distinction: the enemy is that which is excluded from the Collective but may be 
included later; interiority and exteriority thus depend upon decision.4 Secondly, and 
slightly confusingly, the Collective has another kind of exteriority: ‘"collective" in the 
singular does not mean that there is just one of them, but that its function is to bring 
together a collection of some sort, in order to make its members capable of saying "us"’ 
(210) – there are the Achuar, the Arapesh, the West…. Thirdly, when ‘Nature’ 
disappears, collective affairs are plunged into a ‘state of anarchy’ – that is, there is no 
mutually recognised arbiter for political-cosmological disagreements anymore. Again, 
Latour channels Schmitt: under the Modern Constitution there could be no ‘war,’ only 
‘police operations’ because ontological disagreements were referred to Nature as a 
transcendent arbiter via its transparent intermediary Science, a process categorically 
distinct from politics. This no longer holds. Finally, under such anarchic conditions, 
inter-collective relations become a matter of diplomacy (Stengers 2011a, 2013) as no 
group can declare itself an Occident or a ‘West’ that differs absolutely from an Eastern 
Orient by virtue of having access to Nature via Science. It is, Latour argues, only by 
understanding the disappearance of the old dual-sovereignty regime, accepting the risk 
that this ungroundedness confers on all beings, and then recognising the reality of the 
resultant ‘war’ that diplomatic ‘peace negotiations’ can begin. 
Written in response to the so-called ‘Science Wars’ of the mid-1990s, in PoN 
science is not ‘politics by other means’ nor is ‘everything political.’ Instead, science 
now becomes that which renders the universe – or, rather, pluriverse (cf. James 1909) – 
articulable and facilitates the representation of non-humans. Politics, meanwhile, 
becomes that which collects the Collective and enables the gradual assembling of a 
more agreeable cosmos – as opposed to a kakosmos5 (Latour 1999a, 16; 2004a, 217) – 
in a complex, dynamic public space in which nothing is excluded a priori but not 
                                                 
4 Latin decidere ‘to cut off.’ 
5 Greek kosmos ‘good order, well-ordered arrangement’; kakos ‘bad, evil.’ Cf. Clark (2011, 
211-14) who doesn’t recognise this distinction in his reading of Latour. ‘Cosmopolitics’ 
derives from Stengers (2010, 2011a). 
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everything can be included either. Politics becomes, in a mantra, ‘the progressive 
composition of the common world’ (53). 
While Latour’s more recent political works certainly follow on from this fin de 
siècle text, the proceduralism of the Parliament has been largely abandoned. To put it in 
Latour’s own words,6 it is a work appropriate to ‘an earlier, less benighted time’ (2014a, 
5). While retaining the agenda of ‘progressive composition,’ Latour’s politics begins to 
appear less in the guise of a ‘Parliament’ than a ‘generalised international’ (Edkins and 
Zehfuss 2005). In order to reckon with Gaia in all her inherent immanence and irruptive 
imminence, Latour turns to geopolitics – and to ‘values.’ 
Inquiry7 
Simultaneously a magnum opus and a work in progress, AIME (2013c) synthesises the 
larger part of Latour’s works to date, displaces some previous tenets8 and introduces a 
metaphysical quasi-system that lays itself open to interventions from ‘co-investigators’ 
who wish to alter or add to the preliminary ‘report.’9 It finally fulfils the challenge 
posed in Abidjan in the mid-1970s: to produce a philosophical anthropology of the 
West. Responding to the titular provocation of WHNBM, it asks: if ‘we’ have never 
been Modern then what have ‘we’ been? 
By separating ‘values’ from ‘institutions,’ Latour distinguishes reference, 
technology, law, religion – all those things the Moderns are said to cherish – from their 
concrete, entangled instantiations. To each of these valuable values he accords a ‘mode 
of existence.’10 AIME then constructs an alternative metaphysic that, it is hoped, will 
                                                 
6 This comment was directed at Michel Serres’ Natural Contract (1995) but seems justifiably 
transferrable. 
7 All references in this section (‘Inquiry’) are to AIME (2013c), unless otherwise stated. 
8 For example, ‘hybrids’ are no longer ‘the order of the day’ (Dalby 2003, 182); Latour now 
rejects this concept (2013d, 561). 
9 http://www.modesofexistence.org/ 
10 This concept derives primarily from Souriau (1943) and Simondon (1958). See also: Deleuze 
and Guattari (1994, 72-75) 
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institute and instaur11 these precious modes more competently and progressively than 
the Modern Constitution. 
I am going to proceed as if the Moderns had discovered during their history – most 
often as borrowings from other civilizations, moreover – a number of values that 
they hold dear and that constitute, as it were, their very self-definition, even though 
they have never had an entirely firm grasp on these values. (14) 
The days where ‘we’ could go around declaring our values to be Natural, Universal and 
thus Obligatory are over; in order to act diplomatically rather than imperially, ‘we’ must 
come to recognise those things we value as values – and defend them as such. By way 
of AIME's ‘charitable fiction’ (15), Latour hopes to compel those-who-thought-they-
were-Modern to ‘present themselves once again to the rest of the world’ (13). 
The modal metaphysic that results from this mission is consistent with the basic 
kernel of Latour’s thinking since at least Irreductions: that things are events and 
continuities are the results of specific actions rather than underlying substances. The 
difference is that there is now no one way of associating, enunciating, relating, 
articulating, persisting, becoming: there are many. AIME’s fifteen modes are neither 
definitive nor exhaustive; Latour claims that they are derived from experience (James 
1912) rather than a priori ratiocination and are therefore amendable and open to 
addition. The modes are divided into five sets of three and each is accorded an 
abbreviation (e.g. [rep]); when modes meet this is called a ‘crossing’ (e.g. [rep·ref]). 
AIME can be understood as a kind of semiotics writ-metaphysical in that each mode has 
its own semiotic rulebook with unique ‘felicity conditions’ (488-89; cf. Austin 1962) – 
particular ways of distinguishing success from failure, truth from falsehood. Crucially, 
all modes are ontological equals and must be encountered on their own terms. For this 
reason they are explicated herein individually. 
Of course, such a project defies summary (cf. 244). The purpose of the 
following is not, therefore, to stand for the text it condenses. Rather, this partial and 
self-interested reconstruction (a) précises the specific onto-political propositions that 
Latour claims to be submitting to ‘the planetary negotiation that is already underway’ 
                                                 
11 The French ‘instauration’ translates as ‘establishing’ or ‘instituting’ but is used by Latour as a 
replacement for ‘construction [fabrication]’ (151-178; cf. Souriau 1943). See also: Latour 
(2011b), Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 43). 
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(17); and (b) sketches the skyline of the conceptual metropolis that will be creatively 
recombined in the hazily impressionistic portrait of Gaia (and her politics) that is to 
follow. These modes are summarised, therefore, in order to both explicate the precise 
propositional content of Latour’s geopolitical philosophy (as it stands at the time of 
writing) and to lay the conceptual basis for the latter part of this essay. 
[5] Infrastructure 
The final group of Latour’s 5x3 schema forms the infrastructure of the Inquiry and so 
must be understood before the others. 
[net]works 
The mode explored by Irreductions and actor-network theory (Latour and Callon 1981; 
Latour 1988a, 2005b), [net] enables the tracing and assembling of all the heterogeneous 
elements required for any ‘course of action’ regardless of domain or interpretive key. 
This mode suffers from ‘ontological anaemia’ (163) in that it paints a monochrome 
world that disregards modal specificities in order to achieve maximum associational 
connectivity. It is only the starting point for AIME – no being can live by [net] alone. 
[pre]position 
The mode that founds AIME, [pre] compels a moment of indecision in which existents 
must decide how – in what manner, by which fashion – to pass next. AIME focuses on 
neither nouns nor verbs but rather adverbs: politically, habitually, morally, etc. The 
momentary hesitation of pre-positioning enables the detection and selection of these 
adverbial, modal nuances. [net] only follows the patterns of stitching, [pre] captures the 
variegation of the threads – it renders the world in full colour. 
[dc] 
Alluding to the ‘double click’ of a computer mouse that produces information 
seemingly directly, instantaneously and without mediation, [dc] is not really a mode at 
all but an ‘anti-mode,’ a Cartesian ‘evil genius’ that attempts to short-circuit all modes 
by reducing them to the instantaneous, transcendent transfer of information. It is a 
conceptual character (much like ‘the Moderns’) that serves as a foil to the Inquiry. 
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[1] First 
The first group of modes, although the most general, do not form the ‘foundation’ for 
the others, even if they radically precede them. They are, like the ideal Prime Minister, 
first among equals. 
[rep]roduction 
When a mayfly hatches, finds a mate, lays its eggs and perishes in a single day; when a 
stone monument endures for millennia whilst unceasingly performing an energetic 
‘dance of electrons’ (Whitehead 1920, 182): both are examples of [rep]roduction. Both 
Darwinian and Whiteheadian, [rep] is the mode through which an entity maximises 
continuities in order to remain in existence a while longer (91-2). Lineages are those 
chains of living beings that achieve reproduction in the conventional sense of that word. 
Lines of force are those things falsely termed ‘inanimate’ that achieve continuity 
through other creative means – e.g. Whitehead’s ‘dance.’ However, [rep] is restricted to 
neither mayflies nor monuments; ‘it concerns everything that maintains itself: 
languages, bodies, ideas, and of course institutions’ (99-102). [rep] dispenses with 
‘Nature’ as a ‘unified material medium’; instead, every thing produces its own 
articulation, its own ‘meaning’; there is ‘creativity all the way down’ (Latour 2009b, 
468-70). 
[met]amorphosis 
By passing through [met]amorphoses, beings achieve subsistence not by maximising 
continuities [rep] but by maximising transformations. This mode is explicated in AIME 
through psychogenesis and ethnopsychiatry (e.g. Nathan 2000) but is ‘infinitely more 
inventive’ than that – the gene mutations of evolutionary biology are as exemplary of 
this experience as are therapeutic practices (203, 287). [rep] and [met] together form ‘a 
sort of matrix or kneading process from which the "human" can take nourishment […] 
branch out, accelerate, be energized’; these modes are said to ‘precede the human, 
infinitely’ (203). 
[hab]it 
In the vast majority of existential situations there is no need to undergo the hesitations 
of [pre]. [hab]it allows beings to settle into well-oiled rhythms; it smoothes the fractious 
12 
discontinuities in evental becoming, achieving an ‘an effect of immanence’ by veiling 
‘all the little transcendences that being-as-other explores.’ However, habits are not 
‘shams,’ or ‘dogma’ – on the contrary, the constancy they provide ‘makes the 
world habitable’ (268; cf. Heidegger 1971). Habits are good or bad, true or false 
‘depending on whether they veil or lose what has launched them’; in other words, a 
good habit retains the ‘memory’ of [pre] and can return to it as necessary; bad habits 
abandon [pre], forget being-as-other and doom existents to their present rhythmic 
patterns (266-72). 
[2] Quasi-objects 
As we approach quasi-objects, we are no longer investigating the radically pre-human 
but, rather, enter the realm of anthropogenesis (Leroi-Gourhan [1964]1993) where 
‘humanoids became humans’ because of their creative associations with technology, 
fiction and, finally, reference (372). 
[tec]hnology 
This mode predates the evolution of anatomically modern humans by hundreds of 
thousands of years. When an inventor cries ‘Eureka!’ having fixed the bug in his 
contraption; when a chimpanzee fashions a twig into a tool to extract delicious termites 
from beneath the earth: both are equally [tec]hnological.12 This mode is found in the 
hack, the ruse, the inventive rupture. It denotes not ‘an object, a result, but a movement’ 
that takes from both inert and living entities, including the body of the technologist, 
‘what is needed to hold together in a lasting way, to freeze, as it were, one of the 
moments of metamorphosis’ (223-25). [tec] folds time, it pleats space (Latour 2002a; cf. 
Serres and Latour 1995, 60-61; Deleuze 1993); it creates objects that enjoy the 
temporary obduracy of [rep] but with a repeatability that enables trials. Techniques 
create the possibility not only of technological civilisation but of the human itself 
(Latour and Strum 1986; Simondon 1958). 
[fic]tion 
There is no mode of ‘language.’ Fiction, from the Latin fictionem, should connote 
‘fashioning, forming.’ [fic] folds [tec] beings once again, obtaining another kind of 
                                                 
12 Greek tekhnē ‘art, skill, craft.’ 
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alteration that engenders worlds of shifting figurations – beings that may slide from 
material to material but never transcend their media. Such entities ‘depend on our 
solicitude’; ‘if you turn off the radio, leave the cinema, or close the book’ they 
disappear (325-26; cf. Latour 2011b; Souriau 1943); they must always be 
‘accompanied, interpreted.’ However, their force is formidable. Without the shifting of 
figurations, the play of signifiers or the intricate semantics of clothing and architecture, 
there could be no art, politics, religion, law or science (249-50). 
[ref]erence 
A pedologist digs soil samples from a carefully mapped section of a living rainforest 
[rep] and, via specialised instruments [tec], gradually [met]amorphoses their 
epistemically pertinent properties into transportable, manipulable inscriptions [fic]; an 
informative chain of transformations [ref] is thus produced (Latour 1999a, 24-79). 
Knowledge is never achieved by a salto mortale13 between two points (James 1912), but 
always through a ‘dialectic of gain and loss’ (1999a, 70) that maintains constants at the 
cost of transformations at every stage. It may be rare but when continuous referential 
connectivity is achieved, truth circulates ‘like electricity through a wire’ (1999a, 69). 
In the end, when everything works, when the network is in place, access is indeed 
obtained; you put your finger on a map, a document, a screen, and you have in your 
hand for real, incontestably, a crater of the Moon, a cancerous cell deep within a 
liver, a model of the origin of the universe. You really do have the world at your 
fingertips. (109) 
There is correspondence, there is objective knowledge when there is circulating, 
instrumented reference.14 Nobody is born a knowing subject but we become 
epistemically subjectivised in our encounters with referential circuits. 
[3] Quasi-subjects 
Quasi-objects let us know, speak, create, leave our mark on the world (372); without 
them there would be – without irony or idealism – no human beings. The modes of 
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quasi-subjects add further strata to this inheritance; they give us groups, responsibilities, 
rights, solidarities. 
[pol]itics 
This mode can occur in any collective situation: ‘A family, even an individual, a firm, a 
laboratory, a workshop, a planet, an organization, an institution: none have less need for 
this regime than a state or a nation, a rotary club, a jazz band or a gang of hooligans’ 
(2003, 149). However, it can fail to occur in any collective situation too: ‘it is perfectly 
possible to talk of elections, of power struggles, of international relations, of influence, 
etc., without for all that saying these things politically’ (2003, 161). In its most 
mundane instance, [pol] involves the enunciation of a ‘we’ that can be accepted or 
rejected by those it convokes; whenever adherence is achieved, a ‘Circle’ of 
representation (on the outward) and obedience (on the return) is thus traced – passing 
through an undetermined ‘state of exception’ at each stage (346; cf. Schmitt 2007) – and 
‘temporarily associated wills’ are produced, obtaining ‘unity from a multitude’ (133). 
This is the only way to acquire freedom and autonomy in a Collective (cf. Lippmann 
1925; Schneewind 1998).  
I am auto-nomous (as opposed to hetero-nomous) when the law (nomos) is both 
what I produce through the expression of my will and what I conform to through 
the manifestation of my docility. (2003, 150) 
[law] 
In French law it is moyen (means) – ‘do we have a means for that?’; in British law it is 
grounds – ‘what grounds do we have?’ These are the legal entities that permit the 
movement ‘from facts to principles’ (364). A lawyer inspects a contract, signed by his 
hand years previously; the mere persistence of his body [rep] from that space-time to 
this is not sufficient to make the actantial shifting-out [fic] of the document hold to him; 
these disjunctions are only bridged, the utterances only made binding, in [law] (McGee 
2013, 214). All ‘law can grasped as an obsessive effort to make enunciation assignable’ 
(Latour 2010d, 295). These ‘obsessive efforts’ needn’t necessarily pass through the 
files, journals and courtrooms of formal, institutionalised law – ‘the anthropology of 
law attests to hundreds of astonishing procedures for attaching promises to their authors 
by solemn oaths and imposing rituals’ (371); however, in its endless cataloguing of 
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decisions and reattaching of enunciations and enunciators ‘via the perilous routes of 
signatures, archives, texts and files,’ the folophilia of formalised law demonstrates legal 
translations most intensely. Any legal relation can be (literally) put to trial and any can 
fail but if they hold then nomos circulates through the Collective and ‘humans may live 
in the house of law’ (2010d, 274-77). 
[rel]igion 
If α asks ε ‘do you love me?’ and ε replies ‘why are you asking me this? I told you so on 
the 28th of April!’ then ε has misunderstood α’s entreaty as a request for knowledge [ref] 
or, worse, for unmediated truth [dc] when α was really requesting a renewal, a 
revitalisation of their relationship. If ε had instead replied ‘of course, my love, always’ 
this would, in speaking the language of love, have produced a ‘scale model’ (Latour 
2013e, 118) of the [rel]igious experience. The love engendered by the Good News, the 
gospel, establishes an immanent incarnation that produces persons by bestowing unity 
upon them through a gaze of undivided attentiveness (302). There is no God but the 
immanent God that is realised through the soul-saving ‘procession’ of hermeneutic 
‘betrayals, translations, fidelities, inventions’ (315). Religious translation does not 
access the far away [ref] but rather the nearby, the neighbour, the prochain (321); it 
produces not information but tradition – ‘each purification becomes a new treasure that 
is added to the sacred repository and enriches it, complicates it, further’ (2001, 225). 
Religion doesn’t establish facts but rather tremulates ‘the make-up of daily existence’ 
(2009b, 462); suitably amplified it might even usher in ‘a virtual people of the saved 
and the newly close who elude all borders,’ a ‘sacred nation’ (2013e, 148, 161). 
[4] Oikonomia 
The Greek root of ‘economy,’ oikonomia,15 has spawned many meanings over the 
millennia. From the Stoic kosmos, ‘economized by divine providence or by nature 
herself’ (Leshem 2013, 37), through the oikonomia psuchōn (economy of souls) of the 
Patristic Christians to the neoliberal Economy-as-supercomputer (Mirowski 2013), it 
has signified a Rational and thus Obligatory order of things. ‘The Economy’ – that other 
Modern sovereign (Foucault 2008) – is, for Latour, an unholy amalgam that must be 
ontologically disaggregated. 
                                                 
15 Oikos ‘house, habitation.’ 
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[att]achment 
If we describe ‘the Economy’ as the coldly calculating system that circulates goods 
through the Collective we misspeak (at least) twice. First, the foundation of these flows 
is not ‘cold calculation’ but ‘passionate interest’ – calculation, at whatever temperature, 
follows the production of desires. Second, these passions form not a ‘system’ but, rather, 
specific kinds of networks. For any thing there is a list that defines ‘not only the other 
existents through which it has to pass in order to subsist but those that it can no longer 
do without’ (432); these intense, fervent, undisentangleable relations are its 
[att]achments. Economics as ‘the science of passionate interests’ (Latour and Lépinay 
2009) should, therefore, be the science of producing calculative instruments that better 
format the circulation of the Collective’s attachments, better habitating the Umwelten16 
that these interests stitch together (Latour and Callon 1997). However, an 
Umweltökonomie of this scope remains uninvented. 
[org]anisation 
When Peter and Paul agree to meet tomorrow at 5:45 under the big clock at the Gare de 
Lyon they construct a ‘script’ [fic] that exerts a ‘hold’ on them (390). However, no 
script is ever simply ‘followed’ because scripts overlap, pile-up, contradict, bury one 
another. Paul may have only one body [org·rep] but ‘Paul’ undergoes indefinitely many 
shiftings-out [org·fic], being pulled in many directions at once (400). [org]anisation is, 
then, the writing, overwriting, following-through and working-out of scripts that ‘hold’ 
those they signify (391; cf. Cooren 2000). However, [org] crosses more than [fic]; when 
scripts become ‘ballasted’ [org·tec] their force and durability is amplified manyfold: 
Who can fail to feel tiny while approaching the Pentagon? Facing the Egyptian 
pyramids, how could the most narcissistic general, before starting a battle, not 
relate his own small size to the "forty centuries that loom over him"? (418) 
Once sedimented, materialised, mineralised, scripts may cast a formidable shadow long 
after their organisers have returned to dust; thus, mountains of these fossilised 
injunctions pile up all around us. These stacking-effects – and the ever steeper gradients 
                                                 
16 German ‘environing-worlds’ or ‘environments.’ 
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of resistance they produce (419) – disabuse us of any ‘Mega-Script’ (403) needed to 
macro-organise the Whole. ‘The Economy’ is, therefore, a superfluous hypothesis. 
[mor]ality 
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, 
always as an end and never as a means only. (Kant [1785]1959, 47) 
Gone are the days when we could ignore this beautiful maxim’s subtle yet disastrous 
corollaries: that non-humans could be treated as pure means and membership of the 
Kingdom of Ends could be decided once and for all by philosopher’s fiat. 
[…] an enigma is posed to every existent: "If I exist only through the other, which 
of us then is the end and which the means? I, who have to pass by way of it, am I 
its means or is it mine? Am I the end or is it my end?" […] That tree, this fish, 
those woods, this place, that insect, this gene, that rare earth – are they my ends or 
must I again become an end for them? (454-55) 
In order for the Collective to be composed, some entities must be made means and 
others ends; the Optimum must be calculated [mor] and decisions made [pol]. ‘The 
Economy’ as that which has always already calculated the Obligatory Optimum thus 
becomes the epitome of immorality, short-circuiting, as it does, both economics and 
politics [dc]. Moral goodness henceforth becomes, first, sensitivity to moments of 
means-ends indeterminacy and, second, a commitment to continually reprise the 
calculation of the optimal distribution of means and ends – to calculate the incalculable 
in service of a ‘civilization to come’ (462; Latour and Hache 2010). 
With this messianic message, AIME’s philosophico-geopolitical journey arrives 
at its apotheosis. 
Geopolitics17 
Though partial, selective and simplistic, the above (a) traces the tacitly geopolitical 
character of Latour’s philosophy from its inception, (b) outlines the basics of his mature 
philosophy, every aspect of which has political ramifications, and, at the same time, (c) 
                                                 
17 All references in this section (‘Geopolitics’) are to Facing Gaia (2013b), unless otherwise 
stated. 
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précises his diplomatic propositions vis-à-vis the West’s ‘values.’ Thus equipped, we 
can now creatively reconstruct Latour’s geopolitics more comprehensively by, first, 
examining several of the intellectual allies that he enrols and then, second, articulating 
its key concepts, drawing out connections between AIME and Facing Gaia that Latour 
might imply but does not specify. 
Allies 
Lovelock 
If Galileo’s great discovery was that the Earth is an astral object like any other then 
James Lovelock’s great discovery is that Galileo was wrong: the Earth is ‘possibly 
unique in the universe’ because it is a living planet (Lovelock 2009, 1). Terrestrial life 
has flourished for more than two thirds of the Earth’s 4.5 billion years – an ostensibly 
miraculous feat. The sun becomes significantly hotter as it ages18 and the planet has 
suffered myriad astronomic cataclysms in its time. The ‘Earth should be dead, just like 
Mars. It is not’ (62). This is Lovelock’s dangerous idea: life on Earth actively maintains 
the chemical and climatic conditions conducive to its present ‘ensemble of organisms’ 
(Lovelock 2006, 208).19 The Earth terraforms itself – la Terre se terraforme. 
Latour’s reading of Lovelock is enthusiastic but creative, arguing against the 
characterisation of Gaia as a ‘superorganism’ and for a ‘charitable’ (58) reading that 
understands it as a loose, dynamic plurality (2004a, 199; 2014d). In this understanding, 
Gaia is not an overarching über-agency but rather a centreless, irreducible entanglement 
comprising many disunified agencies that achieve a collective goal: ‘to keep the Earth 
habitable for whatever are its inhabitants’ (Lovelock 2006, 207-8). If organisms adapt 
their environment to their needs as they adapt to their environment (72) then Gaia is the 
result and permissive condition of this complex evolution, not its final cause or 
quartermaster. There is only one Gaia but Gaia is not One. She is ‘a new political entity’ 
whose name must be thought of like ‘France’ or ‘Scotland’ (135) – a power that collects 
a Collective. 
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[…].’ (Lovelock 2006, 19). 
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Neither reductionist nor vitalist, her constituents neither ‘de-animated nor over-
animated’ (59), Gaia is not insensitive to our actions, nor is she ‘disinterested’ – she is 
inter-esse par excellence.20  Unlike Nature, she is a fully ‘secularised theological 
concept’ (Schmitt 2005, 36) of which one need suppose no absolute transcendence or 
immutability. However, though divine she is not benevolent in any way. In facing Gaia 
we are confronting a quite lethal enemy. Both Latour and Lovelock are convinced that it 
is only by using the language of war with respect to Gaia that we can be shaken out of 
our complacency and brought to our senses (cf. Latour 2004a). This secular divinity, 
this ‘roaring beast’ on which we are but ‘ticks’ (134), this fearsome foe that will 
inevitably ‘dictate the terms of peace’ between our conflicting parties (Lovelock 2009, 
20; cf. Stengers 2011b, 163-64) – she is the gē of Latour’s geopolitics. 
Sloterdijk 
However, it is not only to Lovelock that Latour looks for earthly ideas. The text of 
Facing Gaia was dedicated to Peter Sloterdijk (2) in whom Latour finds, in some 
respects, a philosophical fellow traveller (e.g. Latour 1999b, 2009a; Sloterdijk 2013b, 
228-36). Sloterdijk’s narration of modernity as the progressive ‘explicitation’ of the 
conditions necessary for life parallels Latour’s account of it as the increasing 
entanglement of humans and nonhumans, and his genealogy of ‘The Globe’ links 
closely with Latour’s rejection of modernist universalisms (Sloterdijk 2009, 2013a; 
Latour 2008a). However, Sloterdijk offers more than moral support and reinforcement. 
His ontology of atmospheres, envelopes, bubbles and foam (Sloterdijk 2011, 2014) 
fleshes out Latour’s ontology of networks, ameliorating its ‘anaemic’ fixation on lines, 
links and nodes, restoring volume and immersiveness. Latour connects the two regimes 
by metaphor, positing that ‘a cloth is nothing but a finely-woven network’ and, 
therefore, surfaces can be thought of as well-meshed networks with their porosity 
‘depending on the density of the stitching’ (Latour 2011c, unpag.). This connection 
underwrites his subsequent assimilation of Sloterdijk’s ‘immunology,’ which Latour 
dubs ‘the first anthropocenic discipline’ (88). A sphere, not unlike Gaia, ‘is a world 
formatted by its inhabitants’ (Sloterdijk 2005, 232); immunology, then, studies the 
processes by which the interiorities of these ‘complex ecosystems’ are generated by 
‘protective walls’ and ‘elaborate systems of air-conditioning’ (Latour 2011c). The gē in 
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Latour’s geopolitics must, therefore, signify not only Lovelock’s Gaia but also 
Sloterdijk’s spherological Umwelten. 
Latour, Lovelock and Sloterdijk all converge upon a common realisation: that 
there is only one Earth, that ‘we are imprisoned in its tiny local atmosphere’ (56) and 
that we must therefore be monogeists (Sloterdijk 2013a, 6, 161) – those who know they 
have only one planet but ‘don’t know Its shape better than they knew the face of their 
God of old’; those who are confronted with ‘a totally new kind of geopolitical theology’ 
(97) and therefore require a radical renovation of political philosophy. 
Lippmann 
For Latour (2004a, 280-81; 2005a, 2008b), following Walter Lippmann and John 
Dewey, politics is ushered into existence by issues – ‘no issue, no politics’ (Marres 
2005a, b). Lippmann’s The Phantom Public founds this political philosophy: 
Where the facts are most obscure, where precedents are lacking, where novelty and 
confusion pervade everything, the public in all its unfitness is compelled to make 
its most important decisions. The hardest problems are those which institutions 
cannot handle. They are the public’s problems. (1925, 121) 
Lippmann disavows the ideal of the ‘omnicompetent citizen’ (1925, 11) who could 
theoretically ground democracy by remaining abreast of all the issues concerning him; 
he therefore asserts the necessity of governance and professionalism. However, 
Lippmann also rejects the possibility of omnicompetent officials and thus affirms the 
necessity of public participation in situations where governance fails. The public that 
assembles around an issue does not govern; it wagers on either the ‘Ins’ or the ‘Outs,’ 
lending its force to one side or another in order to resolve intractable disputes (1925, 
116). 
Although rejecting Lippmann’s technocratic tendencies (2004a, 281), Latour 
accepts the necessity of expertise and, consequently, of governance (128). The 
imperative, for Latour, is not to politicise everything but to detect where and when 
issues form and publics coagulate as a result; it is about making the right matters 
political at the right times, with suitable assemblies. 
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Dewey 
In The Public and its Problems (1927), Dewey riposted Lippmann’s pessimistic 
assessment of democratic possibility while nevertheless endorsing and developing his 
philosophy. For Dewey, like Lippmann, a public is brought into existence when the 
indirect consequences of ‘conjoint action’ are perceived as an issue that can only be 
resolved collectively.21 For Latour, our ecological predicament results from our chronic 
insensitivity, our inability (or unwillingness) to recognise the indirect consequences of 
our actions – in short, from our failure to be collected by Gaia. 
[…] the loop that is necessary to draw any sphere, is pragmatic in John Dewey’s 
sense of the word: you need to feel the consequences of your action before being 
able to represent yourself as having taken an action and realized what the world is 
like that resisted it. […] No immunology is possible, without high sensitivity to 
those multiple, controversial, entangled loops. (94, 96) 
Here Lippmann and Dewey stitch together Lovelock and Sloterdijk. Geopolitics 
requires political aesthetics – a continual renovation of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ 
(Rancière 2004; Yusoff 2010), the never ending tracing of the ‘loops’ of cause and 
consequence that bring interested publics into existence. This task is as scientific [ref] 
and artistic [fic] as it is political (Dewey 1927, 184). 
The polity in Latour’s geopolitics is, as before, a dynamic, complex and scale-
nonspecific public space in which concerned constituents work out their issues through 
assorted mediators and representatives. However, there is now an added urgency: it is 
not only the needs of non-human friends that must be represented but also the 
‘vengeful,’ non-linear mobilisations of the enemy. 
Serres 
An old ally (Latour 1987a), Michel Serres’ The Natural Contract ([1990]1995) 
foreshadows much of Latour’s work and is an essential reference point for Facing Gaia 
(126). For Serres, as for Lovelock-Latour, our senseless parasitism of nature plunges us 
into a ‘war’ against the world itself, which reacts by threatening overwhelming 
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need only assemble those concerned by it (Latour 2004b). Cf. Clark (2011, 2013b, 2014) 
who interprets Latour contrariwise. 
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violence. Only two options are then availed: ‘death or symbiosis.’ Political science thus 
becomes ‘geopolitics in the sense of the real Earth’ (1995, 34, 44). The sympathetic 
resonances with Facing Gaia are obvious; however, the crucial element vis-à-vis 
Latour’s project is Serres’ collapsing of the distinction between scientific and social 
laws: 
What language do the things of the world speak, that we might come to an 
understanding with them, contractually? […] the Earth speaks to us in terms of 
forces, bonds, and interactions […] (1995, 39). 
Serres makes all natural relations, including gravitation (1995, 108-9), a matter of 
cosmic legality in order to do for humans-in-nature what Rousseau did for humans-in-
society: imagine a peace-making ‘contract’ (cf. Burdon 2015). 
Cybernetics (from kybernetikos ‘good at steering’ and kybernetes ‘steersman,’ 
‘guide’ or ‘governor’) is defined by Serres as the ‘art of steering or governing by loops’ 
(1995, 42). Gaia, according to Latour, is cybernetic in this ‘old and frightening sense of 
the word’: she is ‘a politically assembled’ entity with ‘the ability to steer our action’ by 
imposing ‘limits, loops and constraints’ (135). She is both the geohistorical product of 
these spiraling, serpentine relations and the inter-agency that quells or amplifies them 
according to her own agenda. Her discipline is brutal and inescapable, her ‘sovereignty’ 
undeniable (135). However, within her boundaries, beings can attain auto-nomy by co-
forming the nomos to which they conform – they can, like the quasi-subjects of politics, 
‘obey their own rules’ (137). 
Serres also shares Latour’s regard for religion, noting its complex etymology 
that may derive from relegare (to go through again, reprise), religare (to attach) or 
religiens (careful, opposite of negligens); Serres suggests that religion inherits from all 
three roots but particularly the latter: ‘Whoever has no religion should not be called an 
atheist or unbeliever, but negligent’ (1995, 47-8). Both Latour and Serres demand a 
religious orientation towards the secular, the mundane, the worldly. 
While embracing the idea of politico-legal relations with (some) non-humans, 
Latour rejects Serres’ idyll of harmony and symbiosis as out-dated: 
[…] in a quarter of the century, things have become so urgent and violent that the 
somewhat pacific project of a contract among parties seems unreachable. […] The 
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best we can hope for is to stick to a new sort of jus gentium [law of nations]. 
(Latour 2014a, 5). 
Schmitt 
We encountered ‘the toxic and unavoidable Carl Schmitt’ (101) first in PoN, where the 
notions of friend/enemy, decision and war/police operations were deployed. These 
concepts resurface in AIME’s Circle [pol] that is ‘exceptional’ at each stage and in 
Latour’s identification, alongside Lovelock, of an unpoliceable Gaian ‘war.’ In Facing 
Gaia, Latour draws extensively on both Schmitt’s Political Theology ([1922]2005) and, 
most significantly, his Nomos of the Earth ([1950]2003). If we are to go from being 
‘Humans’ lost in an abstract, totalised, indifferent Nature to being ‘Earthbound’ housed 
under the concrete, pluralised, dangerous divinity of Gaia, Latour argues, we need to 
understand the specific spatial order, the nomos to which we are bound. 
Nomos comes from nemein – a word that means both "to divide" and "to pasture." 
Thus, nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a 
people becomes spatially visible – the initial measure and division of pastureland, 
i.e., the land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it and 
following from it. (Schmitt 2003, 70) 
Moderns, for Latour, can neither declare nor defend their land, soil or nomos – and 
cannot, therefore, become ‘Earthbound’ – for the same reason that, in Abidjan, they 
seemed unanthropologisable: a culture with access to Nature via Science needs no 
explanation or justification. However, if Nature has lost its sovereignty, if we are 
gathered as publics by issues that no extant sovereign can decide, if the ‘frontier of 
modernisation’ and its mission civilisatrice have been rendered archaic by the rising 
East, if we are thus in a fully ‘diplomatic’ situation and if we are ‘at war’ with nothing 
less than a planetary divinity then we must overcome the kneejerk response that 
denounces the defence of any specific terroir [locality] as the work of a cul-terreux 
[yokel] or reactionary (Latour 2010c). On the contrary, in order to engage in geopolitics 
in the sense of the real Earth we must consider very carefully what sort of soil are we 
prepared to defend (114). Of course, ‘soil’ here bears no necessary relation with the Blut 
und Boden that the Schmittian language suggests. Instead we must ask: what are our 




A territory is everything that you need to survive and that may suddenly fail you. 
[…] Of course the territory does not resemble the nicely coloured geographical 
maps of our classrooms. It is not made of nation states – the only actors that 
Schmitt was ready to consider – but of interlocking, conflicting, entangled, 
contradictory networks that no harmony, no system, no ‘third party,’ no overall 
Providence may unify in advance. Ecological conflicts do not bear on the 
nationalistic Lebensraum of the past but they do deal with ‘space’ and ‘life.’ The 
territory of an agent is the series of other agents that are necessary for it to survive 
on the long run, its Umwelt, its protective envelope. (119) 
Tying together attachment, the pluralist reading of Gaia, Deweyan political aesthetics, 
Sloterdijk’s spherology and Schmitt’s Earthly nomos, ‘territory’ is perhaps the core 
concept of Latour’s geopolitics (Latour 2010c; Latour, November, and Camacho-
Hübner 2010).22 It has little to do with territory in the historical, statist sense (e.g. Elden 
2013a), nor is it equivalent to the conceptual ‘territory’ of Deleuze and Guattari (1987). 
Every entity has a list of those things that it cannot do without. These lists are 
made explicit by ‘tests of deprivation [épreuves de la privation]’ and beings are 
constantly surprised by the heterogeneous array of dependencies that irrupt all around 
them. Only the most fortunate and well habitated beings can take their territories for 
granted [att·hab].23 When a previously reliable car breaks down or a Ukrainian 
politician threatens to shut off Europe’s gas supply, such events explicitate territories 
that are always under ‘threat of disappearance [menace de la disparition].’ Territories 
follow a topological rather than topographical spatial logic – the ‘bounded areas’ of 
traditional cartography are ‘uninhabitable.’ Metric proximity is unimportant in itself; 
ease of accrual and habitation are what matter and these qualities are spatially complex. 
Lastly, territorial relations are not unidirectional but reciprocal: a farm animal is in the 
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absent in English. 
23 Latin habitare ‘to live, dwell’; habere ‘to have, possess.’ 
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territory of its farmer but the farmer is also in the territory of her animal (Latour 2010c, 
unpag.). Territories are entanglements. 
This conceptualisation of territory as ‘an unbounded network of attachments and 
connections’ (Latour 2014b, 15) establishes a distinctive geopolitical condition: an 
economy doesn’t distribute goods circulating across a given territory, it formats the 
territories themselves; globalisation has nothing to do with ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ but rather 
concerns intensifications and extensions of entangled dependencies (Latour 1993); a 
Collective doesn’t have ‘a territory’ but rather as many territories as it has constituents; 
and geopolitics is not a matter of bickering over bounded surfaces but, rather, publicly 
contesting these poly-dimensional spaces. With this geopolitics shifts, to neologise, 
from turf-wars to Earth-wars. 
Appropriation 
Every important change in the image of Earth is inseparable from a political 
transformation, and so, from a new repartition of the planet, a new territorial 
appropriation. (Schmitt [1954]1997, 38) 
For Schmitt, every nomos is founded by an act of territorial appropriation or 
Landnahme – a raw, arbitrary assertion of will that establishes the basis for all 
subsequent legal order. If all useable land has been appropriated by some sovereign 
state or other and if the Earth has been fully mapped and orbitally photographed then 
what further appropriations or transformations of imagery are possible? ‘Has humanity 
today actually "appropriated" the earth as a unity, so that there is nothing more to be 
appropriated?’ (Schmitt 2003, 335). Has geohistory come to an end?... It would seem 
not (143). The topological, ecological, theological imagings of the Earth as feedback 
loops, entangled territories, critical zones (Latour 2014e), planetary boundaries 
(Rockström et al. 2009), competing cosmoses, belligerent divinities, porous envelopes 
and the Umwelten of every species couldn’t be more different to the Earth as something 
fully, finally, objectively known, framed in a ‘world picture.’ Even with saturation-level 
global surveillance, the ‘shape’ of the Earth is still not known – and it will never be 
known with finality because it is not a static, unchanging thing, prostrate before our 
interrogations. Perhaps we could know the shape of Mars because it is a dead planet but 
not the life-suffused Earth. No amount of epistemic extension will put an end to Earth’s 
26 
shifting imagery [fic·ref]. But what of appropriations? Who or what might be the ‘great 
appropriator’ of a new nomos? 
Far from being the ‘land-appropriation,’ the Landnahme celebrated by Schmitt, it is 
rather the violent re-appropriation of all Humans’ titles by the land itself. […] 
When we begin to gather together as Earthbound, we realize that we are summoned 
by a power that is a fully political one since it possesses what is called in Anglo-
American law ‘radical title’ to the whole land […]. (136) 
Many science fiction writers foresaw an expropriatory threat to humanity coming from 
outer-space or even from beneath the sea – but who could have predicted that it would 
come from all around us? Quite an irony: Mars cannot declare war but Earth can. 
Revenge of Gaia, indeed! She is the agent of this geohistorical transformation. It is as 
though we were trespassers on her land and she is fetching her gun… 
The will to colonise The Globe territorially, economically and metaphysically 
has been exposed for the folly it always was. The mere rotundity of the planet is 
incidental – a quaintly preliminary discovery (cf. Mackinder 1904). Geo-graphy qua 
Gaia-graphy is, for Latour, not an ‘aid to [imperial] statecraft’ (Parker 1982) but the 
science, transcending social/natural disciplinarity, that describes the ‘front lines’ of this 
planetary confrontation, laying out the problems of our collective geopolitics. 
Decision 
If we are to enter into a ‘power sharing’ (136) arrangement with Gaia, to stake out a 
kind of Schmittian Großraum,24 then the Collective’s interiority and exteriority must be 
determined [pol]; the Optimum must be calculated, means and ends distributed [mor]. 
‘Yes, there are beings that do not deserve to exist. Yes, some constructions are badly 
made. Yes, we have to judge and decide’ (2013c, 142). Latour concedes that the 
‘dosage’ of Schmitt’s concepts ‘should be watched as carefully as we would do with a 
powerful poison’ (113); however, he makes no apology for imbibing this pharmakon:25 
The great virtue of dangerous and reactionary thinkers like Schmitt is to force us to 
make a choice much starker than that of so many wishy-washy ecologists still 
                                                 
24 Literally ‘large-space,’ more accurately ‘sphere of influence.’ 
25 A substance that is a cure or poison depending on dosage. 
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swayed by unremitting hope. Schmitt’s choice is terribly clear: either you agree to 
tell foes from friends, and then you engage in politics, sharply defining the 
borderlines of real enough wars – ‘wars about what the world is made of’ –; or you 
shy away from waging wars and having enemies, but then you do away with 
politics […]. (105) 
The ‘hard, dark job of politics’ – beautiful souls need not apply – may turn stomachs but 
there is no alternative (105-6).26 The Modern Constitution was only superficially 
humanist. Only collectives organised in a preconceived fashion (i.e. as nation states) 
were recognised as collectives at all; the rest were ‘primitives’ to be alternately 
exploited and patronised. Moderns were to hold pre-Moderns either by the throat or by 
the hand. During the nomos of the jus publicum Europaeum (Schmitt 2003) ‘natives’ 
had no moyen to the land, the so-called ‘terra nullius,’ on which they merely lived 
[rep·law]. Today, such human-on-human domination is considered the foulest of 
crimes; however, non-humans remain in such a state of exception. Kant’s moral 
Kingdom may have sufficed in 1785 (or even 1985) but not today.  
We have infringed the environment of the other species, just as if, in the affairs of 
nation states, we had occupied the land of other nations. (Lovelock 2006, 13) 
Our planetary omni-exploitation was permissible under the geopolitical theology of 
Nature – that immutable, eternal exterior – but Gaia, our ‘hypersensitive’ sovereign-
landlord, is responding to our imperial overreach with menacingly muttered eviction 
notices. Consequently, we must beat a hasty retreat – an orderly one if we are clever, a 
frantic, desperate one if we are not; and, in order to do that, we must overcome Kant’s 
inadequate generosity by extending moral hesitation to all Gaia’s constituents. We 
cannot retreat into nothingness, into utopian nowheres – we need food, we need fuel, we 
need air… [rep·mor]; however, making the whole world our means is as impossible as 
making it all our ends. Our very existence depends on knowing our place, our limits, 
our nomos, our cosmos (119). Decisions must, therefore, be made – indeed, they are 
being made, if not by ‘due process’ then otherwise. The best we can hope for is to make 
these decisions better. This responsibility cannot be shirked; the Earthbound have more 
                                                 
26 Cf. the quasi-Machiavellian realpolitik of Latour’s earlier works (Latour 1987b, 1988a, b; 
Harman 2014). 
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enemies than Gaia – enemies who understand the dark arts of politics very well indeed 
(Latour 2013f; Michaels 2008). 
Earthbound 
The strength of Reason is also its weakness: it believes that it requires no justification, 
no life-support, no air-conditioning, no networks. Years ago this is what set a younger, 
bristlingly iconoclastic Latour out to destroy the bifurcation between force and reason 
and tear down the technoscientific ‘war machine.’ However, we have long since passed 
‘peak critique’; unvarnished cynicism towards science has been ‘miniaturised,’ 
mobilised and absorbed by all manners of nefariousness (Latour 2004b; Stengers 
2011c). Scientific reason must be saved from itself – it must be grounded: ‘Earthbound 
scientists are fully incarnated creatures. They are a people. They have enemies.’ They 
recognise that it is their instruments, their institutions, their circuits of informative 
transformations [ref] that make them strong, not their transcendent access to an airless, 
otherworldly ‘Nature’ [dc]; they have dependencies and must therefore calculate and 
defend their territories; they are open about their fears and motivations and proclaim 
that such passions [met·att] strengthen their intuitions; ‘pixel after pixel, data point after 
data point’ they populate the Collective, make the world speak and ceaselessly renovate 
the distribution of the sensible. They thus become ‘a new form of non-national power 
having a stake in geopolitical conflicts’ (120). Modernist celebrants of Science still 
labouring under their Sisyphean ‘obligation to undeceive minds’ (Latour 2013c, 171), 
will surely linger but the Earthly sciences (Latour 2007a), another nation that ‘eludes all 
borders,’ demand unrepentant allegiance [pol] (Latour 2014f, 63). 
However, the Earthbound’s salvation depends not only on science but also on 
religion; both manners of immanence-production are needed – science, which produces 
information through the transformations of reference; and religion, which produces 
tradition through the torments of reverence. Earthbound religion, as in AIME, is that 
which tremulates the humdrum rhythms of daily existence [hab], personifying by 
rendering us lovingly hypersensitive to the nearby, the prochain – the opposite of 
negligence. It is only by becoming religiously, assiduously ‘occupied and preoccupied 
by the Earth’ (141) that we can begin to compose ourselves with her. Earthbound 
religion leads not to ‘another world,’ either astronomically or spiritually, but to ‘this 
same world grasped in a radically new way’; it leads us to ‘the time of the end’ 
[rel·mor] (138-39; cf. Anders 1962). 
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Finally, if the Earthbound can be tied to the anthropos of the Anthropocene, 
neither should be conflated with ‘the human race.’ 
Indian nations in the middle of the Amazonian forest have nothing to do with the 
‘anthropic origin’ of climate change – at least so long as politicians have not been 
distributing chainsaws at election times. Nor do the poor blokes in the slums of 
Mumbai, who can only dream of having a bigger carbon footprint than the black 
soot belching out of their makeshift ovens. Nor does the worker who is forced to 
drive long commutes because she has not been able to find an affordable house 
near the factory where she works. (80) 
To begin from ‘humanity’ as a pre-given unity, unveiled by science, ‘beneath’ the 
tiresomely fluctuating vicissitudes of subjectivity, would only short-circuit the 
‘demogenesis’ needed to birth the Earthbound. Instead, anthropos must be 
disaggregated ‘into many different people with contradictory interests, opposing 
cosmoses’ (81). It is not that the scientific perspective is not valid; it is that no one 
party, not even the sciences, gets to read the Book of Gaia, much less write it – and less 
still to force that Book on uninitiated Others (Debaise et al. 2015; Latour 2014d). 
Diplomacy 
So, what is to be done? The sciences have now been reaccommodated in another 
Constitution, religion too; every mode has been granted its own thread of experience, its 
own truth conditions and, therefore, its own rationality; everything has been pluralised, 
anthropologised, prepared for diplomacy – and so there is no reason to shy away from 
cosmopolitics for the sake of maintaining a ‘critical attitude,’ no reason to shrug at the 
Enlightenment. 
Westerners, get up on your feet! It’s up to you now to fight for your place in the 
sun! […] reason is not so weak that it can never win. It has just been a little too 
long since it had a chance to fight, for lack of real enemies acknowledged as such 
[…]. Screaming "relativism!" whenever one is faced with trouble is not enough to 
keep oneself in good marching order, ready for the extension – yes, the extension – 
of rationality. (Latour 2002b, 37) 
The ‘blackmail of the Enlightenment’ (Foucault 1984, 42) – that it is something one 
must be either for or against – thus becomes an archaism but so does the traditional 
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response to it (Latour 2004b). ‘Critique,’ for the Earthbound, is one competency, one 
capability among others (Boltanski 2011); just one relatively blunt implement in a much 
larger toolbox. Yes, ‘everything is dangerous’ (Foucault 1984, 343); but everything is 
also endangered – and so we have more to do than ever. 
Because Western values have been put at risk and, like the polytheisms of old 
(Assmann 2010), have become translatable (10-12), all those old, enlightened dreams 
of solidarity that the Moderns so adored can be pursued again as geopolitical 
propositions that operate through techniques not of universalisation but of belonging 
[tec·pre] (Stengers 2013). Thus dislocated from the dominion of the ‘true self,’ a 
‘middle ground’ (White 1991) can finally be encountered. This may seem like a 
humiliating demotion to some; however, if Westerners could stop flagellating either 
others or themselves for a moment, they might realise that while they should not be 
pompously prideful in their proposals nor should they exoticise those of others: 
None of those so called ‘traditional’ people, the wisdom of which we often admire, 
is being prepared to scale up their ways of life to the size of the giant technical 
metropolises in which are now corralled more than half of the human race. (128) 
Westerners need no longer pose as either Gods or Devils. After unconditionally 
relinquishing their imperial iconoclasm (Latour 1999a, 266-92; 2004b, 2010e), after 
recognising the fragility of their own ecologies of practices (Stengers 2011c, 2013), 
they must begin to advocate their collective values in ‘the planetary negotiation that is 
already underway’ (Latour 2013c, 17; 2011a). 
Geohistory 
However, geopolitics, as Latour proposes it, bursts the seams of inter-tribal parlays. 
Gaia is herself a political power – a cybernetic, autonomy-enabling sovereign, 
perchance an enemy, with radical title to all but the planet’s darkest depths. The loops 
and bonds by which she guides, governs and punishes are the very self-interested 
trajectories of her constituents that subtly alter their environments in order to render 
their future thriving more probable (72). Gaia is not just the scene of politics, nor a 
violent interjection to it, but a dramatic, swirling convolution of world-convening 
relations – a collective constituted by all the constituents that she collects. Human 
politics explicates, amplifies and formalises what was already happening – non-human 
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Gaians already format their spheres, adore their attachments, adapt their environments, 
measure their means, cultivate their cultures, nurture their natures. Each in their own 
ways, at wildly varying intensities, through spiraling, sinuous movements that ensnare, 
ensphere, entwine and envelop, all Gaians ‘geopolitic.’ 
Is this an extension of politics? Indeed it is. How strange to have thought that only 
Humans are ‘political animals’? What about animals? What about all sorts of 
animated agencies? None of them should be de-animated to the point of having no 
voice at all; nor should they be over-animated to the point of speaking in the comic 
repertoire of anthropomorphic citizens. (137) 
Are we returned, then, to the blunt, monoscopic naïveté of Irreductions where every 
thing is political and politics is everything? Not at all. These tendrilous encirclings don’t 
extend to dead planets like Mars. Asteroids, nebulae and atoms are, of course, 
effervescently creative in their own magnificent, primordial ways [rep·met] – and to 
stardust you shall return… – but it is only here, immersed in life, that we can witness 
the rich, sparking harmonics of this unique crossing [rep·pol]; only here, on the 
sublunar27 Earth, is there the raw, focused inter-sensitivity needed to beget a geo-polis; 
only here, amidst the geohistory of the Gaian kybernetes, can constituents become so 
reactively, responsively, aesthetically acute as to undergo the circuitous composition of 
a cosmos. However, responsiveness is not responsibility. Gaia can summon no 
Leviathan (136); there is a Great Society but no Great Community (Dewey 1927). Of 
course, it is not that Gaia ‘lacks’ the appurtenances of a formalised polity per se – it is 
only we Earthbound that such a supplement impels; it is, rather, that Gaia, our past and 
our present, will only be our future – we will only have a future – if such an assembly is 
realised. 
The Earthbound do not share the burden of the White Man. Gaia will be grasped 
by neither throat nor hand. There will be no mission civilisatrice extending meaning, 
morality, religion and politics into the inert, otherworldly shadow-land of an absolutely 
indifferent Nature. ‘Things in themselves lack nothing, just as Africa did not lack whites 
before their arrival’ (Latour 1988a, 193). There are enemies to be declared but no 
barbarians to be vanquished; the brook only babbles if our sciences (or, perhaps, our 
                                                 
27 Literally ‘beneath the moon’ but, more specifically, ‘earthly’ or ‘Earthbound’ (e.g. Sloterdijk 
2013a, 17-19). 
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poets) have not yet learned its tongue.28 Gaians are already impeccably articulate. 
However, things do not and will never speak for themselves – they have to be coaxed, 
collected, represented; de-scissions will always be made de facto but due process is a 
philosopher’s dream; it may be that every existent agonises over means and ends but to 
calculate the Optimum, to transform the city into a state, to furnish these self-relating, 
self-serving vectors with the elaborate, cosmos-assembling capabilities of science, art, 
religion and politics: these are the tasks thrust upon the Earthbound. 
However, Gaia, our terrible we-know-not-what, does not negotiate (Hamilton 
2014). It is we who must negotiate her, as both navigators and diplomats. Our charts 
and translation tables are no sooner assembled than made obsolete; our fumbling palms 
scramble ceaselessly just to keep up. Our sovereign hears no appellants – only through 
our atmo-chemical perturbations are we even perceptible (cf. Uexküll 2010). She is 
hypersensitive but only interested in herself; her discipline is undisputable; through her 
sheer dynamism any hope of symbiosis is dashed. And yet, for all that, Gaia offers us a 
home, an oikos – the only such offer that we will ever receive (pace science fiction). 
Her nomos of the Earth may not be ours and it is she, radically entitled, that will dictate 
the terms of the peace. But another Earthbound world, Latour will argue, is possible; 
and it begins with the renegotiation of all values. 
Conclusion 
When Kjellén coined ‘Geopolitik’ in fin de siècle Sweden, he took it to form part of a 
holistic, neo-Linnaean knowledge system that would rationally inform the efficient 
utilisation of state power. ‘Politik,’ for Kjellén, simply denoted ‘the theory of the state,’ 
which was defined as ‘a geographical organism or phenomenon in space’ (Kjellén 
quoted in: Holdar 1992, 312). ‘Geo-’ therefore signified ‘the territory, or the realm, of 
the State as its body’ (Holdar 1992, 312; cf. Ratzel 1897; Semple 1911; Mackinder 
1931; Haushofer [1942]1998). Geography as a discipline has long since overcome such 
reactionary reductionisms and their fixation on the planet’s fertile surface. However, in 
the process ‘geopolitics’ was abstracted from the earth per se and became, as Elden 
laments, ‘conﬂated with global politics or political geography writ-large’ (2013b, 15). 
The manner in which Latour’s latest works help to reacquaint geo- with gē 
should, by now, be obvious. His creative geo-ontology grounds human – or, rather, 
                                                 
28 ‘Babble’ and ‘barbarian’ both relate to barbaros ‘non-Greek-speaking.’ 
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Earthbound – politics in a terrestrial condition that is inextricably elemental, 
indomitably pluralistic and radically empirical. No longer a ‘static frame,’ the very 
‘composition of the ground itself, from the bedrock to the atmosphere just above it’ 
(Latour 2014c, 3) becomes geopolitical. However, after Latour we cannot ask ‘what is 
the geo- in geopolitics?’ without also asking ‘what is the politics?’ Both sides of the 
equation, as we have seen, are transformed in his account. Moreover, his liberally 
sketched Gaian scenography collects far more than the Critical Zones of geochemistry 
and the Circlings of political existence. His ‘new geopolitics of the Anthropocene’ wills 
to convolve all the imponderably plethoric rhythms and cadences that make our home 
planet, our oikos, hum and judder with the vibrations of life. 
In this much, there are important resonances between Latour’s work and that of 
Elizabeth Grosz whose writings have, to date, provided the principal philosophical 
inspiration for ‘rethinking the geo-’ in political geographical debates (e.g. Yusoff et al. 
2012). However, Grosz’s political ontology is, from Latour’s perspective, unacceptable 
in that it defines politics in terms of power. 
What we understand as the history of politics – the regulations, actions and 
movements of individuals and collectives relative to other individuals and 
collectives – is possible only because geopower has already elaborated an 
encounter between forms of life and forms of the earth. […] Power – the relations 
between humans, or perhaps even between living things – is a certain, historically 
locatable capitalisation on the forces of geopower. (Grosz in: Yusoff et al. 2012, 
975) 
Geopolitics for Grosz would, therefore, concern the manner in which ‘the regulations, 
actions and movements of individuals and collectives’ – the worldly workings of 
political power – presuppose the subtensive out-flowings and up-takings of geopower. 
This conception is inadmissible for Latour as it erases the specificity of the political 
mode of action (cf. Rancière 2001). Power does not beget politics, issues do. 
This disjunction distinguishes Latour from not only Grosz but also more or less 
the entire history of geopolitical thought. Of course, it jars with the reactionary lineage 
of Kjellén through Kissinger to Kaplan (2012); however, more interestingly, it also 
contrasts with both the tradition of critical geopolitics (e.g. Dalby 1991; Tuathail 1996) 
and those who would seek to base a reformed geopolitics on Foucault’s biopolitics (e.g. 
Elden 2013b, 15; 2015; Foucault 2008). Latour makes a strong distinction between 
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politics and governance, the latter comprising not a mode of action but, rather, an 
arrangement of organisational and technical competencies that, if overextended, in fact 
smothers politics (e.g. Latour 2013c, 336). From that point of view, if bio- and geo-
politics come to signify various techniques of governance or governmentalities then 
politics per se is thereby effaced, reduced to power and varieties of resistance thereto. It 
matters little, then, how dispersed, decentred or deinstrumentalised power is said to be; 
there is scarcely more ‘politics,’ modally defined, in Foucault’s biopolitics or Grosz’s 
geopower than there is in Kjellén’s Geopolitik. 
This need not, however, mean that these bodies of work are incompatible. 
Developing the above, one might distinguish between geopolitics, geogovernance and 
geostrategy, the latter pair being the civilian and military wings of a broad assemblage 
of collective technics. Analysis of such apparatuses would be no less crucial to 
understanding collective and inter-collective relations than the strictly ‘political’ and, 
with our conceptual vocabulary thus expanded, Latour’s political ontology could be 
combined with the insights of other forms of geopolitics, forming a sharply discerning 
yet flexible matrix for the analysis of geopolitical problems of all kinds. However, while 
Latour’s work presents demonstrable possibilities – or, at the very least, provocations – 
it is not without its problems. 
First, ‘the West.’ Simon Dalby (2003, 193) is not alone in noticing that Latour 
often conflates ‘Modern’ and ‘West,’ melding them ‘into a single geopolitical entity’. 
Latour is by no means consistent with these designations. In AIME ‘the Moderns’ are 
performatively engaged as an actually existing people, albeit one with a ‘variable 
geometry’ and ‘elastic borders’ (2013c, 8, 14), while ‘Western,’ ‘Modern,’ ‘White’ and 
‘European’ are used seemingly interchangeably, with obviously polemical intent. 
Elsewhere he claims that ‘the West no longer exists’ and instead there are only 
‘Europeans, North Americans, French, Japanese […]’ (2007b, 19). These terms – 
Modern, Western, etc. – might be best understood as conceptual characters or 
‘charitable fictions’ that facilitate research on an inquisitorial terrain that regularly 
shifts. However, if this is pardonable for a speculative philosopher, it is deeply 
problematic for political geographers and forms one of the main obstacles to the 
adoption of Latour’s ideas. 
Second, Schmitt. No mass of caveats or pluralisations is capable of muffling the 
shrill, fascistic howling of the infamously ignoble ‘Crown Jurist of the Third Reich’ and 
‘Lenin of the bourgeoisie’ (Müller 2003, 4). Undoubtedly, it is the very unsettling 
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prickliness of a Schmitt, Hobbes or Machiavelli that makes these such important 
thinkers; and, indeed, one decade’s irredeemable monster might be another’s much 
needed bucket of cold water – even intellectual histories do not end. However, Latour 
does not do enough to cleanly extricate his concepts from the all too chilling 
nomenclature of blood and soil. Adopting Chantal Mouffe’s (2005) distinction between 
agonism and antagonism might debarb Schmitt further; however, the history of political 
thought is a deep well and one wonders if there aren’t less troublesome resources to be 
hoisted.  
Third, and relatedly, war. Latour defines ‘war,’ after Schmitt, in a broadly 
technical manner: ‘war does not mean necessarily blood and weapons,’ but rather ‘the 
absence of a referee’; however, in the same breath he underscores the jolting emotivity 
of war-talk: ‘Everyone understands what is meant by such a danger: "Call the police!" 
"Prepare for war, the enemy is coming!"’ (2013b, 112). He concedes that ‘it is 
somewhat nauseating to hear academics rant on about doom, blood and war’; however, 
he makes no apologies: ‘no amount of warm feelings’ will save us (2013b, 99; cf. 
Lovelock 2006, 197). Latour is of course correct that serious ecological threats often 
seem too ‘distant’ to provoke political action, even when they are far more objectively 
foreseen than the conventional security threats that transfix entire civilisations (Latour 
2014f). His martial terminology shouldn’t be considered profane but nor is its necessity 
obvious. One can demand a vocabulary that eschews the casual cosiness of conventional 
political theory without resorting to such blunt instruments. A climate scientist arguing 
fiercely with a denialist at a public meeting may lack a ‘sovereign’ to whom he can 
appeal to settle the dispute; however, no matter how much they bellow – no matter even 
if they brawl – they are not ‘at war’ in a sense that should be so easily literalised. If 
Earth-wars are in our future then further turf-wars surely are also. We would do well to 
remember the difference between heated arguments and charred flesh, even if we are 
staring at a future that is going up in flames (cf. Latour 2007a). Are we at wholesale 
(Earth-)war with Gaia? Quite possibly. But amongst ourselves? Not yet… 
Bruno Latour is often critiqued though rarely well; his thought, both brilliant and 
problematic, deserves its critics for both reasons. Only a few dissenting comments have 
been offered in this ‘charitable’ reading – doubtless others will object otherwise. 
However, whatever its degree of objectionability, there is no doubt that Latour’s work 
offers a veritable trove of thought and provocation to disciplinary geopolitics and 
cognate academic clusters wheresoever instituted. So, if ‘inheritance is an activity’ 
36 
(McGee 2013, 177), how will we inherit from Latour’s geo-politico-philosophical 
reassemblies? 
I grant that it is hard for the young people born after us to inherit from the so-called 
May ’68 generation; but can someone tell me what we were supposed to do with 
the legacies left behind by the generations of "August '14," "October '17," and 
"June '40"? Not an easy task, to inherit from the twentieth century! (Latour 2013c, 
281) 
Indeed not. One could tell the story of this fact with the history of the word ‘geopolitics’ 
alone. If nothing else, I hope I have shown that these two problems of inheritance – 
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